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Extant research demonstrates that citizens’ evaluations of national economic performance 
play an important role in determining trust in politicians and political institutions, while 
evaluations of their own economic situation play a lesser or even negligible role. Utilizing 
ANES data and more apposite measures of personal economic privation during an age of 
globalization and deindustrialization, this paper finds that the extent to which citizens 
perceive themselves and their families to be economically insecure has a statistically 
significant and substantial negative effect on political trust. Indeed, the effect at least matches 
those of macro economic evaluations and party identification. This paper therefore adds a 
new dimension to our understanding of the economy-trust nexus, and contributes to the small 
but growing body of scholarship on insecurity’s effects on political behavior.   
































































Economic Insecurity and Political Trust in the United States 
 
“Washington, D.C., has become an island. The gap between our citizens and our government 
has never been so wide” (President Jimmy Carter, 15 July 1979). 
 
“We face a deficit of trust—deep and corrosive doubts about how Washington works that 
have been growing for years” (President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 27 
January 2010).  
 
For some time, it has been almost axiomatic that each new prospective president or prime 
minister in the oldest and most stable democracies will presage his or her term in office by 
declaring a crisis of confidence in the nation’s governing institutions, quickly followed by a 
plan to remedy the widespread malaise. Inevitably, political trust remains low, or, more often, 
falls even further. The next leader repeats the process, and so on ad infinitum. Low trust, 
then, is not new, and a rich seam of trust research has been mined by political scientists over 
several decades (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974). Little noticed by many academic colliers, 
however, is that the era of low trust has coincided with a growth in economic insecurity in the 
world’s most advanced economies. Regardless of the ebb and flo  of national economic 
fortunes, citizens’ job tenure and health and retirement benefits are becoming increasingly 
insecure as globalization and other developments increase labor-market competition and 
corporations mothball generous health plans and final salary pension schemes. There has 
been a Great Risk Shift (Hacker, 2008) in the United States and possibly elsewhere from the 
broad shoulders of government and corporations onto the narrow shoulders of individuals. 
Despite these important developments, little social science work has focused on the 
consequences of the shift in risk for political behavior generally (Hacker et al., 2013) and 
































































political trust specifically. This paper represents one of the first attempts to explore these 
effects.  
 They are worth exploring because trust matters. Thinking about its effects in the 
round, Hetherington (2007, p. 1) concludes that political distrust “has defined [the] American 
political landscape over the last several decades,” from the election of outsider presidents to 
handicapping progressive domestic policies to increasing support for recent conservative 
foreign-policy interventions (Hetherington & Husser, 2012). Trust’s importance is also 
evident at a more micro level. A lack of it undermines presidential approval (Hetherington, 
1998), increases voters’ support for non-incumbent and third party candidates (Hetherington, 
1999) and elite-challenging initiatives such as a term limits (Karp, 1995), but may, when 
combined with high levels of efficacy, increase political participation (Gamson, 1968). 
Distrust also leads citizens to think their political leaders are corrupt (Wroe et al., 2013), and 
even influences the extent to which citizens obey the law (Tyler, 1990), pay their taxes 
(Scholz & Lubell, 1998) and trust each other (Brehm & Rahn, 1997).  
This paper contributes to the scholarly debate on the causes of political distrust by 
offering a more nuanced and detailed account of the role of personal economic privation. 
Research demonstrates that citizens’ trust in politicians and political institutions is in part 
driven by their evaluations of the performance of the national economy, but the conventional 
wisdom is that personal economic experiences and evaluations do not play much of a role 
(McAllister, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Dalton, 2004, pp. 64-5, 75; Lawrence, 1997, p. 
112-13; Lipset & Schneider, 1983, pp. 99-101). A key claim of this paper is that the 
conventional wisdom is wrong. It is so because it has relied on a few crude indicators that fail 
to capture how individuals’ really perceive their personal economic situation. In particular, 
the indicators generally used by political scientists fail to measure accurately an increasingly 
important concern of citizens in mature post-industrial democracies: that is, economic 
































































insecurity. Drawing on the innovative work of Jacob Hacker and his colleagues, this paper 
utilizes some new insecurity measures to improve our understanding of the trust-economy 
nexus. Taking into account a range of other factors, it finds that citizens’ perceptions of their 
economic insecurity have a statistically significant and substantial negative effect on their 
levels of political trust.  
There is compelling evidence that economic insecurity has increased steadily from at 
least the mid-1980s and probably from the 1970s, and is now an important concern for many 
individuals and families in the US and elsewhere (Hacker, 2008; Hacker et al., 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013; Kalleberg, 2013; Jacobs, 2007; Osberg, 2009; Rockefeller, 2007; Standing, 
2011). It is, indeed, one of the defining economic and political issues of our age, and 
encompasses among other things insecurity in employment, in retirement, in health, in 
widowhood or as a single-parent, and in the family wealth that can guard against economic 
shocks.  
Given its breadth, insecurity is unlikely to have a single cause. The Great Recession, 
which began in the US in 2007 and spread around the world, has exacerbated the problem of 
insecurity, but insecurity was high before the recession set in and will persist after the 
recession is over (Hacker et al., 2012, 2013). Indeed, insecurity has a number of interlinked 
and interacting causes that are deeply embedded in advanced postindustrial economies. 
Deindustrialization (Iversen & Cusack, 2000), technological change (Rehm, 2010; Scheve & 
Slaughter, 2004), and de-unionization (Rehm, 2010) have all amplified job insecurity. These 
factors are sometimes lumped together under the title of globalization, but it is helpful to 
recognize that they are conceptually distinct from, albeit linked to, globalization. 
Globalization, which refers to the process of international economic integration (Scheve & 
Slaughter, 2004), can itself drive insecurity in employment by increasing the elasticity of 
demand for labor (Rehm, 2010; Scheve & Slaughter, 2004) and by exposing labor to 
































































exogenous shocks (Rodrik, 1998). The causes of other forms of insecurity—in healthcare and 
retirement, for example—are less obvious and perhaps more controversial. Hacker (2008) 
attributes the rise in insecurity in the United States in these domains to deliberate policy 
choices by governments and employers designed to privatize risk. While the government and 
private-sector employers once pooled and spread risk via ‘social insurance’ from the Great 
Depression-era onwards, this has been steadily dismantled and replaced with private, 
individual provision in the name of ‘personal responsibility’. Globalization, de-unionization, 
technological change, and deindustrialization are likely to have exacerbated the privatization 
of risk, but the role of government and employers is central; not only was social insurance not 
reinforced in response to the threats to economic security posed by macro-economic changes, 
it was deliberately dismantled, argues Hacker (2008; see also Kalleberg, 2013; Standing, 
2011).  
Despite the contemporary prominence of economic insecurity, and compelling 
evidence of its growth, we probably know more about the causes of insecurity than its 
consequences.
1
 What is known about the latter suggests that economic insecurity could be an 
important explanatory variable in political behavior generally and trust research specifically. 
It has been connected to a range of political attitudes, behavior, and outcomes. Insecurity, and 
specifically job insecurity, has been shown to influence party support, vote choices, and 
election results (Marx, 2014; Mughan et al., 2004; Mughan & Lacy, 2002), and is associated 
with the size of, and support for, the welfare state (Cusack et al., 2006; Hacker et al., 2013; 
Rehm, 2009, 2010, Rehm et al., 2012; Rodrik, 1998). Yet, in the round, “we know strikingly 
little about how the experience of major economic dislocations and worries about them 
affect…attitudes toward the economy and politics,” argue Hacker et al (2013, p. 24). 
This paper contributes to this small but growing body of scholarship on the effects of 
economic insecurity on political phenomena. Its focus is political trust. It reassesses the link 
































































between citizens’ personal economic concerns and level of political trust in the face of 
existing research that has either dismissed the importance of such concerns or relegated them 
to secondary status behind evaluations of national economic performance. The next section of 
the paper reviews what we know and don’t know about the economy and trust, and explains 
why the standard measures of people’s personal economic experiences and worries need to be 
reconsidered. The following two sections briefly introduce some definitional issues and lay 
out the mechanisms via which insecurity may influence political trust. The paper then 
presents the data and methods used to test the insecurity-trust relationship, before reporting 
the results of the empirical analysis. The final section discusses the importance, implications, 
and limitations of the findings.   
 
The Economy and Trust 
The connection between economics and trust seems intuitive and straightforward: citizens 
trust government during economic good times and distrust it during bad ones. One causal 
explanation, rooted in democratic theory, is that citizens hold governments to account for 
their performance, and economic management is a key performance criteria; where economic 
performance is poor, or at least perceived to be poor, it is reasonable to expect that a 
government’s political support will decline (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000, p. 156-61; Clarke et 
al., 1993, pp. 999-1003; Keele, 2007, p. 242; Scharpf, 2000).  
Economic performance is, however, a broad term that incorporates many different 
aspects (Clarke et al., 1989). Objective national-level measures of economic performance 
such as national output, unemployment, and inflation, and objective individual-level 
measures such as family or per capita income, changes in income, and employment or job 
status are often utilized in trust models. But it also common to use subjective indicators of 
performance, such as individuals’ perceptions of the wider national economy or their 
































































personal financial situation. The vast array of possible indicators complicates the economy-
trust story. Which are more important and when?  
According to some analyses, trust fell in advanced industrial democracies at the same 
time as some objective macro measures of economic performance (GDP, inflation, and 
unemployment, for example) were improving. That objective macro trends do not, on their 
face, appear to track with political trust suggests the two are not causally related (Dalton, 
2004; McAllister, 1999). At the micro level, objective economic indicators also seem to be 
unimportant, with several scholars reporting that household income has an insignificant effect 
on political trust (McAllister, 1999; Dalton, 2004, pp. 64-5, 75; Hetherington, 1998; 
Lawrence, 1997, pp. 112-13; Lipset & Schneider, 1983, pp. 99-101; but see Wroe, 2014).  
The general thrust in the literature is that subjective economic evaluations are more 
important individual-level determinants of political trust than are objective criteria (Citrin et 
al., 1975; Dalton, 2004, pp. 64-5, 75, 114-16; Lawrence, 1997, pp. 112-13; Lipset & 
Schneider 1983, pp. 99-101; McAllister, 1999; Whitely et al., 2013). And within the domain 
of evaluations, the conventional wisdom is that citizens’ perceptions of the performance of 
the wider economy matter more than citizens’ perceptions of their own or their families’ 
financial situation (Dalton, 2004, pp. 116-18; Mishler & Rose, 2001). But it also appears to 
be the case that the economy-trust relationship may be asymmetrical. Hetherington and 
Rudolph’s time-series analysis (2008) demonstrates that trust declines during economically 
challenging times, but does not increase when perceptions of economic performance 
improve. Overall, it would be incorrect to conclude that subjective assessments of one’s 
personal or household situation do not matter, but these effects appear to be modest at best 
(McAllister, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Dalton, 2004, pp. 64-5, 75).  
There are, however, several potential problems with the conclusion that subjective 
personal economic criteria are unimportant to trust judgments, or of only moderate 
































































importance at best. As noted by Hacker et al. (2013, p. 24), the first was highlighted nearly 
thirty years ago by Rosenstone, Hansen, & Kinder (1986, p. 177), and remains relevant today. 
They argued that “the frail results produced by survey-based analyses reflect in part the frail 
measurement of changing personal economic well-being. While relatively trustworthy 
measures of aggregate economic conditions are readily available, the reliability and validity 
of individual measures of personal financial security are largely untested” (1986, p. 177). The 
key culprit in their measurement error story is the standard ANES question, which asks 
respondents whether they and their families are “financially…better off or worse off than you 
were a year ago.” As well as better off and worse off, respondents are allowed to report no 
change, resulting in a three-item measure that has been adopted as the standard measure of 
personal well-being by surveys around the world. But as Rosenstone et al. conclude (1986, p. 
177), “pinpointing the connection between economic circumstance and political preference 
based on this lone item is a perilous enterprise” because it restricts respondents’ response 
variance and thus underestimates the impact of changing economic circumstances.  
A second problem is that these broad measures may fail to pick up the most 
prominent economic concerns of contemporary citizens. For example, an individual may well 
answer that she is “better off” financially than a year ago if she has recently been awarded a 
salary increase or if her partner has entered the workforce, but this same person may still feel 
economically insecure if her job is at risk or the value of her house has collapsed. As Mughan 
& Lacy note (2002, p. 533), the economy and politics interact in complex ways, and reducing 
“evaluations to short-term performance judgements alone risks missing important dimensions 
of people’s perceptions of the economy that help to explain facets of political behaviour for 
which the economy’s importance may go unnoticed.” Indeed, such are the trends in advanced 
economies that family incomes are increasing at the same time as economic insecurity is 
growing (Stiglitz et al., 2009). The story that some scholars tell of an economically satisfied 
































































citizenry (Dalton, 2004; Inglehart, 1997a, 1997b) jars with a large and growing literature that 
points not to gains in wealth and security but to greater economic insecurity (Dynan et al., 
2012; Hacker, 2008; Hacker et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2007; Osberg, 2009; Rejda & Haley, 2004; 
Rockefeller, 2007; Stiglitz et al., 2009). The real economic story is that many people are 
hurting financially, primarily because they are increasingly insecure. 
 
Theorizing and Measuring Economic Insecurity 
As with many concepts in the social sciences, there is no settled definition of economic 
insecurity, and thus no agreement on how it should be measured. The main definitional 
debate is whether economic insecurity should be conceived as a subjective or objective state. 
One group of scholars argues that insecurity is best rendered as the subjectively-assessed risk 
of economic hardship (Dominitz & Manski, 1997; Scheve & Slaughter, 2004) while another 
conceives it as the extent to which individuals have actually experienced “hardship-causing 
economic losses” (Hacker et al., 2012, p. 5). The lack of consensus regarding the definition of 
economic insecurity has generated a plurality of different measures to capture it (Bossert & 
D’Ambrosio, 2013; Dynan et al., 2012; Hacker et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2007; Osberg, 2009; 
Osberg & Sharpe, 2009; Rejda & Haley, 2004; Rockefeller, 2007, 2008).  
Researchers more interested in charting and explaining trends in the real economy 
generally utilize objective indicators such as income and income volatility (for a review, see 
Dynan et al., 2012), or more complex multidimensional measures, such as the Economic 
Security Index (Hacker et al., 2010, 2011), that weigh experienced losses in income against 
families’ ability to buffer the effects of such losses. Those interested in the individual-level 
psychological, sociological, and political effects of insecurity usually favor subjective risk 
measures (De Witte, 1999, 2005; Mughan & Lacy 2002; Mughan et al., 2004; Slovic, 1999; 
Sverke et al., 2002, 2006), largely because different people will assess and respond to risk in 
































































different ways (Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013, p. 1018; Dominitz & Manski, 1997; Jacobs, 
2007; Manski, 2004). 
Because this study is interested in the political effects of citizens’ perceptions of their 
personal economic situation, insecurity is taken to be a subjective construct. The paper 
therefore follows Dominitz & Manski (1997, p. 264) and defines it as individuals’ 
“perceptions of the risk of economic misfortune.” Future work may seek to explore the effect 
of experienced insecurity on political trust, but insecurity is operationalized here as 
subjectively perceived risk across a range of domains (employment, health, family, and 
wealth). It is, though, worth noting that despite the plurality of measures in the literature, four 
consistent and robust findings emerge regarding insecurity in the United States. Citizens in 
the US are more insecure than their counterparts in other wealthy and mature democracies; 
economic insecurity in the US increased in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; 
it did so at a faster rate than in other OECD nations; and the Great Recession accelerated the 
increase (Hacker et al., 2012, 2013; Osberg, 2009; Rockefeller, 2007, 2008). 
 
Linking Economic Insecurity and Political Trust  
One issue only touched upon so far is the causal connection between insecurity and trust: 
why should economic insecurity influence the extent to which individuals trust politicians 
and government? A very basic economy-trust mechanism, already established in the 
literature, is that citizens trust governments that perform well and meet expectations. The 
economy is a key performance barometer; thus, economic underperformance by government 
generates lower levels of trust (Alesina & Wacziarg 2000, pp. 156-61; Clarke et al., 1993, pp. 
999-1003; Keele, 2007, p 242; Scharpf, 2000). But this is a thin causal story. It offers little 
insight into individual-level cognitive processes, does not distinguish clearly between micro 
and macro aspects of performance, and ignores the possibility that citizens may make a 
































































different type of evaluation when thinking about their personal economic security compared 
to national conditions. Further, it does not offer any insights as to why economic insecurity 
may be as or more important a determinant of trust than other types of underperformance, 
economic or otherwise.  
Drawing on Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) groundbreaking “prospect theory”, 
Hacker (2008, pp. 25-27) and colleagues (2012, p. 4) have noted the deep psychological 
foundations of humans’ antipathy toward insecurity. Two aspects of prospect theory are 
particularly relevant to theorizing insecurity and its effects. First, individuals assess financial 
risks and outcomes from a particular reference point, which is usually their current position. 
It is likely therefore that people evaluate potential gains and losses in economic security, real 
and perceived, from this reference point. Thus, while wealth may act as a buffer to insecurity, 
everyone is susceptible to insecurity because threats and losses are assessed relative to 
present circumstances.  
Second, and perhaps most important to our understanding of how humans think about 
financial changes and evaluate risks, is the idea of “loss aversion” (Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Of course, the idea that humans are risk averse is hardly new, 
but Kahneman and Tversky were the first to integrate it successfully in a challenge to the 
dominant marginal utility theory paradigm. A key premise of marginal utility theory is that 
people assess gains and losses equally: a dollar loss generates the same unit change (-1) in 
utility as a dollar gained (+1). Kahneman and Tversky discovered that people weigh losses 
more heavily than gains. This asymmetry, or negativity bias, may be an evolutionary 
consequence of natural selection, because “organisms that treat threats as more urgent than 
opportunities have a better chance to survive and reproduce” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 282; see 
also McDermott et al., 2008). Moreover, people quickly grow very attached to items they 
own, which Kahneman and colleagues labeled an endowment effect (1990, 1991). In this 
































































thinking, economic insecurity threatens the core human instinct to avert loses and preserve 
what we already have (Hacker, 2008, pp. 25-27; Hacker et al., 2012, p. 4).  
Negativity bias has been a prominent feature in the work of psychologists and 
behavioral economists (Baumesiter et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) and is gaining 
more traction among political scientists (for reviews, see Levy, 2003; McDermott, 2004; 
Mercer, 2005; Soroka, 2014; and Wilson, 2011). Attitudes, vote choices, and turnout are 
swayed more by the negative traits of presidential candidates and political parties than by 
their positive ones (Holbrook et al., 2001; Kernell, 1977; Lau, 1982) and negative economic 
conditions play a larger role than positive conditions in determining votes for the incumbent 
president’s party in US House elections (Bloom & Price, 1975). In part, this may be 
connected to media coverage of politics and the economy, which is asymmetrically focused 
on negative events and attributes, but a poorly performing economy has an important and 
asymmetrical effect on citizens’ sociotropic economic evaluations independent of media 
coverage (Soroka, 2006). These asymmetries help explain Hetherington & Rudolph’s (2008) 
finding that political trust falls when economic performance is poor but does not recover 
when the economy improves. They also dovetail with a new research paradigm that locates 
political behavior in evolutionary theory (Alford & Hibbing, 2004; Arceneaux, 2007; Smith 
et al., 2007), and particularly the idea that people don’t want to be suckers (Hibbing & 
Alford, 2004).   
So, prospect theory and the wider negativity bias literature provide some important 
insights as to the reasons for insecurity’s importance, most notably that humans are 
psychologically programed to fear it. But why would Americans blame government for their 
insecurity, especially given their strong support for small government and economic 
individualism? One part of the answer is that they advocate these ideas in the abstract, while 
concomitantly supporting a whole raft of government programs designed to alleviate the 
































































insecurities associated with free markets and the general precariousness of the human 
condition. Americans are, in the words of Free & Cantril (1968), ideological conservatives 
and operational liberals (see also Feldman & Zaller, 1992). 
The second part is that government once provided Americans with a greater level of 
protection against insecurity, but withdrew many protections at the same time as insecurity 
was itself increasing due to structural changes in the international economy (Hacker, 2008; 
Kalleberg, 2013; Standing, 2011). In this thinking, Americans should therefore blame 
government for their precarity because it stepped aside when it was needed most (Hacker, 
2008, p. 166). It was not inevitable that an ‘age of anxiety’ would replace the ‘age of 
security’ (Kalleberg, 2013, pp. 24, 86), but a result of deliberative policy choices. It is, then, 
not surprising that government’s incremental withdrawal from the post-war social contract 
would generate considerable distrust given the unyielding attachments people develop to 
social and welfare programs that benefit them (Kahneman et al., 1990, 1991; Pierson, 1994).  
 
Data and Methodology 
To recap, the aim of the paper is to test the individual-level linkage between economic 
insecurity and political trust. A negative relationship is hypothesized: individuals with high 
levels of insecurity will have low levels of political trust. The reason is that insecurity 
activates deep-seated psychological biases, rooted in human evolution and survival, to avert 
loses and preserve the status quo. Government and the political class are blamed for 
insecurity, because economic precariousness violates citizens’ expectations about the role of 
the state.  
Data are from the ANES 2008-09 panel study. Particularly useful is the Survey of 
Economic Risk Perceptions and Insecurity, designed by Jacob Hacker, Philipp Rehm, and 
Mark Schlesinger, which appeared in two waves of the ANES panel (March 2009 and 
































































September 2009). It includes extensive questions about respondents’ subjective assessment of 
the risk of economic insecurity in four specific domains: employment, healthcare, family, and 
wealth. Other waves of the survey probe the same respondents’ political attitudes, including 
political trust, and ask the standard range of demographic, political, and economic questions 
(see DeBell et al., 2010 and Hacker et al., 2013 for more details).  
Variables and Models. The dependent variable, political trust, is constructed from 
responses to the following question asked in May 2009 (wave 17): “How often does the 
federal government do what most Americans want it to do?” The response options are 
always, most of the time, about half the time, once in a while, and never. This five-point scale 
represents an improvement over the standard ANES trust-in-government question, which has 
been criticized for its amorphous, unbalanced categories (Cook & Gronke, 2005, p. 787; 
Gershtenson & Plane 2007).
2
 Another way in which the panel question differs from the 
standard but unasked ANES question is that it does not specifically mention the word trust, 
but instead taps into one of the central dimensions of trust, which is that government should 
be responsive to the citizenry (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974; Miller & Listhaug, 1990; 
Hetherington, 1998, 2007). Understanding trust as responsiveness has a long history. In his 
early work, Miller (1974, p. 952) conceptualized trust as “the belief that the government is 
not functioning and producing outcomes in accord with individual expectations,” and later 
concluded that “an expression of trust in government…is a summary judgment that the 
system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” 
(Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358). More recently, Hetherington defined political trust as “the 
degree to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their 
expectations” (2007, p. 9). These definitions all tap directly into the idea that trust is at least 
in part about the responsiveness of government.  
































































Some scholars, however, regard responsiveness as a key element of political efficacy, 
and specifically external efficacy. To be sure, distinguishing between trust and efficacy, 
definitionally and operationally, is a long-standing problem for political scientists (Citrin & 
Muste 1990, p. 467). But efforts to do so sometimes coalesce around seeing efficacy as a 
system input, and specifically as citizens’ perceptions of their (individual or collective) 
influence on the system, and trust as a system output, specifically citizens’ perceptions that 
political agents are responsive to the community’s demands and interests (Gamson, 1968; 
Mason et al., 1985; Reef & Knoke, 1990, p. 414). Indeed, one of the discipline’s most careful 
empirical analyses of the trust versus efficacy problem concluded that “the responsiveness of 
incumbent authorities” to citizens’ demands should be taken as a measure of trust, not 
external efficacy (Craig et al., 1990). In short, and following a rich research tradition, trust as 
defined and operationalized in this paper is about citizens’ perceptions of the responsiveness 
of the federal government. 
The trust variable is coded 1 if the respondent agreed that the federal government does 
what most Americans want it to do at least half the time (i.e. about-half-the-time, most-of-
the-time, or always = 43 percent) and 0 if the respondent said less than half the time (i.e. 
once-in-a-while or never = 57 percent). The trusting category therefore includes the midpoint. 
The about-half-the-time and once-in-a-while categories together constitute 90 percent of 
responses. Only 6 percent selected most-of-the-time or always and only 4 percent said never.
3
  
The key explanatory variables tap respondents’ perceived levels of economic 
insecurity. This paper follows Hacker et al. (2013) and disaggregates perceived insecurity 
into the four domains of employment, healthcare, family, and wealth. Wave 15 (March 2009) 
of the ANES 2008-09 panel survey asked respondents whether they were very worried, fairly 
worried, slightly worried, or not-at-all worried about a range of negative economic outcomes 
across the four domains.
4
 Four indexes were created to measure the extent to which each 
































































respondent was worried about future-oriented insecurity in each domain. Each index is itself 
constructed from respondents’ average responses to four separate questions, with scores 
ranging from 1 for the least worried to 4 for the most worried. A fifth, composite index 
aggregates and averages each individual’s scores from all the questions across the four 
domains.
5
 Table 1 reports the questions used to construct the indexes, the question means, 
and index means, the Ns, and Cronbach alphas.
6
 The high alpha scores indicate each index is 
internally consistent and tapping a uni-dimensional insecurity construct. The distributions of 
the indexes are presented in figure 1. The expectation is that higher levels of insecurity will 
be associated with lower levels of political trust.  
    [Figure 1 and Table 1 about here] 
A number of control variables are also included in the model. Most important are 
three economic variables. The first (labeled Pktbk Retro in table 2) taps individuals’ 
retrospective assessment of their personal economic situation and is based on responses to the 
following question asked in wave 19: “During the last three months, how difficult has your 
personal economic situation been—extremely difficult, very difficult, moderately difficult, 
slightly difficult, or not at all difficult?” This question may represent an improvement on the 
standard personal finances question criticized by Rosenstone et al. (1986), in part because it 
offers five rather than three response options but also because it asks more broadly about 
one’s personal economic situation rather than the narrower financial situation. The second 
economic variable (labeled Socio Pros) is based on a variant of the standard question about 
the future health of the wider economy. Respondents were asked the following question in 
May 2009 (wave 17): “What about 12 months from now? Do you think the economy, in the 
country as a whole, will be better, about the same, or worse in 12 months?” As noted above, 
prospective evaluations of the general economy have been shown to be important predictors 
of a wide range of political behavior. A third economic variable (labeled Socio Retro) also 
































































taps evaluations of the wider economy, but picks up on perceptions of how it performed in 
the past. It is built from the following question asked in May 2009: “Now thinking about the 
economy in the country as a whole, would you say that as compared to January 2009, the 
nation’s economy is now better, about the same, or worse?” In the case of all three economic 
variables, the hypothesis is that perceived improvements in economic performance, whether 
pocketbook or sociotropic, will be associated with higher levels of political trust. Moreover, 
prior trust research suggests that prospective evaluations of the wider economy should be the 
most powerful predictor and retrospective evaluations of personal economic conditions the 
least powerful. Retrospective sociotropic evaluations should fall in the middle.  
While much extant research has suggested that income may not play a significant role 
in determining political trust (McAllister, 1999; Dalton, 2004, pp. 64-5, 75; Hetherington, 
1998; Lawrence, 1997, pp. 112-13; Lipset & Schneider, 1983, pp. 99-101), more recent work 
has found a relationship (Wroe, 2014). It is anyway important to include income in the 
present analysis because it can act as a buffer to insecurity, and may thus moderate 
insecurity’s effect on political trust. Ceteris paribus, higher wages and by implication greater 
wealth help protect citizens against the vagaries of risk (Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013; 
Hacker et al., 2012, 2013; Rehm, 2009; 2010; Rehm et al., 2012, p. 3; Rejda & Haley, 2004). 
Similarly, education should also act as a buffer to insecurity, because it gives more choices 
and options not available to the uneducated (Sverke et al., 2006, p. 10; Walter, 2010). 
Moreover, education has been shown to be an important independent predictor of political 
trust, with citizens with higher levels of education more trusting than those with lower levels 
(Claes et al., 2012; King 1997, pp. 175-6; Schoon et al., 2010; Wroe, 2014), although this 
relationship may only hold in mature democracies and the causal mechanisms are 
complicated and contested (Hooghe et al., 2015; Van Elsas, 2014). Education is scored on a 
5-point scale and income on a 19-point scale.  
































































It is also important to control for party identification and political ideology, 
acknowledged predictors of trust (Miller, 1974). Republicans and conservatives are generally 
more hostile to government than Democrats and liberals, but the sign of the coefficients is 
sensitive to the occupant of the White House and the majority party in Congress (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Keele, 2005). Citizens are more trusting when 
their partisan and ideological soul mates are in charge. As responses to this study’s key 
attitudinal variables in the 2008-09 panel were sampled during a time of Democratic 
hegemony in Washington DC, the strong expectation is that conservatives and Republicans 
will be less trusting. Both variables are scored on 7-point scales from strong Democrat to 
strong Republican and extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Independents and 
moderates are coded at the scales’ midpoints.
7
  
The model also controls for the usual range of demographic variables, including 
religion, race, gender, and age. Religion is scored as a series of dummies, with Protestant 
excluded as the reference category. Race is also scored as dummy variables, with White as 
the reference. Gender is scored 1 for male and 0 for female, and age is coded in years.  
In sum, there are five trust models, each testing one aspect of the proposition that 
political trust is sensitive to citizens’ perceptions of their level of economic insecurity. While 






Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a non-linear probability model (logit) is used 
to estimate the equations. Table 2 presents the log-odds regression estimates and associated 
statistics. The log likelihoods and chi-square statistics demonstrate that all the models are 
statistically significant.  
































































     [Table 2 about here] 
It is immediately apparent that perceptions of future-oriented insecurity are correlated 
with political trust. The insecurity indexes are statistically significant across all five 
perceptions models. In two models (family insecurity and wealth insecurity), the indexes are 
significant at p<= .01, and in two others at p<=.05 (job insecurity and the composite index). 
The signs are in the hypothesized direction. Americans with high levels of perceived 
economic insecurity are significantly less trusting than more secure individuals. No other 
variable reaches statistical significance across all five models.  
The size of insecurity’s coefficients differs across the models. It is largest in the 
composite model, and notably smaller in the health model. The smaller effect for health 
insecurity may be a consequence of the febrile partisan debate over President Obama’s 
Affordable Care Act, which coincided with the collection of these data. The suggested 
mechanism is that partisan polarization on the healthcare issue crowds out health insecurity’s 
effect on trust and partisanship becomes relatively more important. This finding is supported 
both by the smaller-than-average coefficient for health insecurity and the larger-than-average 
coefficient for party identification in the health model. The wider point, of course, is that 
insecurity’s effect on trust is sensitive to different political, social, and economic contexts.  
Prospective evaluations of the wider economy are significant in the job, health, and 
family models but not the wealth or composite models. Retrospective evaluations of the 
general economy are also significant in three models (health, family, and wealth). Still, it is 
important to recognize that evaluations of the macro economy’s performance do matter in a 
majority of models. People who are positive about the wider economy, whether regarding its 
past or likely future performance, are more trusting than those who are pessimistic. In 
contrast, citizens’ evaluations of their personal economic situation do not influence political 
































































trust in any of the five models. And income, theorized as a buffer to insecurity, is also 
insignificant across all the models.  
Party identification is also a statistically significant predictor of political trust in four 
of five models, and the sign is in the hypothesized direction in each case. Unsurprisingly, 
Republicans were more likely than Democrats to be suspicious of the political class at a time 
of Democratic hegemony in Washington. Surprisingly, ideology is not correlated with 
political trust at standard levels of statistical significance—although the signs are in the 
hypothesized direction. Party identification trumps ideology, in these models at least. 
Education is statistically significant in two of the models (job insecurity and health). 
Controlling for other factors, better educated Americans are more trusting than their less 
educated peers. With only one exception—the vague “other” race category in the wealth 
model—none of the other demographic variables are statistically significant in any model.  
One problem with the log odds coefficients generated by non-linear regression 
techniques is that the magnitude of the effects is not easily interpreted. A secondary analysis 
was therefore conducted using the Clarify add-on to Stata (King et al.,  2000; Tomz et al., 
2003). The analysis simulated first differences in the expected value of the dependent 
variable, trust, holding all other variables in the model constant at their means. Each 
explanatory variable of interest was changed, in the first instance, from its lowest to highest 
value and the effect of the change on Pr(Y=0) estimated—that is, the probability of moving 
from a trusting to an untrusting classification on the dependent variable given the value 
change on the explanatory variable.  
Figure 2 plots the magnitude of the first differences effects and also reports the 
precise size of the coefficients. The primary variables of interest are the five insecurity 
indexes in the first bloc of variables on the left hand side of the figure and accompanying 
table. Changing the score on, for example, the family insecurity index from its lowest (1) to 
































































highest value (4) increases the likelihood of a distrusting outcome by 32 percent, holding all 
other variables constant at their means. Put differently, if Americans’ perceptions of their 
economic situation shifted from very secure to very insecure, political trust would fall by a 
third. The first difference scores for all the insecurity indexes are large, with none dropping 
below 10 percent, and ranging up to 36 percent on the composite index. Equally notable is 
that the magnitude of the first differences effects of four of the five insecurity indexes (the 
health index is the one exception) are larger than the effects of all the retrospective and 
prospective evaluations of the macro economy, when these change from better to worse. 
Moreover, the insecurity effects dwarf the (incorrectly signed and statistically insignificant) 
effects of personal economic evaluations. 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
However, a critic could argue that it is unlikely in the real world that individuals 
would move from being very worried to not at all worried about some aspect of their security, 
or from being a strong Democrat to a strong Republican. An alternative, more realistic 
scenario is to explore the effect of a smaller change. One which allows a robust comparison 
between variables is the effect on Pr(Y=0) of moving from -1 standard deviation below the 
mean to +1 standard deviation above the mean for each X of interest. Figure 3 reports and 
plots these first difference effects. The insecurity indexes’ effects are, of course, smaller than 
those reported in figure 2, but remain important in and of themselves and relative to the other 
explanatory variables. Insecurity has the largest effect of any explanatory variable in three of 
the five models (family, wealth, and the composite), again outgunning the other economic 
variables and even party identification. Its effect is smaller in the job and health models, but 
important nonetheless. Of all the economic variables in the job insecurity model, only 
prospective evaluations of the macro economy have a larger effect on trust, and in the health 
































































insecurity model, its effect is similar to that of retrospective sociotropic evaluations. 
Moreover, insecurity’s effect dwarfs that of personal economic evaluations in all models.  
In sum, the results are stark. The extent to which Americans perceive their economic 
situation to be insecure, across a range of domains, has an important and large effect on their 
trust in the political class. This effect is, in the round, larger for economic insecurity than the 
three other economic variables. The only other variable to match economic insecurity in 
terms of the magnitude of its effect on political trust is party identification, an unsurprising 
result given that the Democrats controlled both the White House and Capitol Hill and a 
deeply partisan and polarized atmosphere dominated DC’s political proceedings (Mann & 
Ornstein, 2012) when the trust responses were solicited in the panel survey. But despite this 
febrile Washington atmosphere, perceptions of economic insecurity are at least as important 
as party identification in determining Americans’ level of trust.  
 
Discussion 
Americans who perceive themselves as economically insecure have lower levels of political 
trust than their more secure peers. And the difference is large. The first differences analysis—
whether moving from the lowest to highest value or from -1 standard deviation below the 
mean to 1 standard deviation above the mean on each explanatory variable—shows that 
insecurity has the largest effect on trust of any variable in three of the five models. Insecurity 
at least matches, and by some measures trumps, evaluations of the wider economy’s future 
performance and party identification. Insecurity is considerably more important than citizens’ 
self-assessment of their recent economic circumstances. The latter result is perhaps not 
surprising given the findings of prior trust research and the criticisms of the questions used to 
tap citizens’ personal finances (Rosenstone et al., 1986), even though the present analysis 
utilizes a broader question that asked about individuals’ economic, not financial, situation and 
































































allowed a more fine-grained response. The inference, however, is not that personal economic 
evaluations don’t matter—clearly they do, because perceived insecurity is one example of a 
personal economic evaluation—but that the traditional questions used by political scientists 
do not measure well the basic economic concerns of citizens in advanced democracies. We 
need to think more clearly about the different types of egocentric economic factors that may 
plausibly influence political behavior and outcomes, and then devise carefully tailored 
instruments to better measure the concepts we want them to measure. Without better 
instruments, political scientists will not be able to tell an accurate and convincing story about 
how our part of the world works. Recent improvements in statistical techniques and 
computing power are rendered redundant in the face of basic measurement error.  
Drawing heavily on the innovative work of Kahneman and Tversky and Hacker and 
colleagues, the paper sketched out a psychologically-grounded causal story to explain why 
economic insecurity may influence the way in, and extent to, which citizens evaluate their 
leaders. To be sure, the empirical analysis, like much social science work, was not able to test 
these mechanisms directly (Hedstrom, 2008), but the causal story is consistent with the 
empirical results. Key to the story is that economic insecurity activates deep-seated 
psychological biases to avert loses and maintain the status quo. Politicians are blamed by 
citizens for their insecurity, because insecurity violates citizens’ expectations that the state 
will provide security. Insecure individuals do not trust government. Most extant theory 
connecting trust to economic factors has relied on a broad-brush story about government 
performance. The theory outlined here provides a more nuanced causal mechanism, which 
identifies why economic insecurity specifically, as opposed to other types of economic 
hardship such as inequality or recession, may drive political distrust. It also fits into an 
increasingly important theme of political science research that stresses the importance of 
negativity bias (Soroka, 2014).  
































































Although the paper did not seek to assess the contribution of economic insecurity to 
the ebb and flow of aggregate levels of political trust over time, instead concentrating on 
individual-level trust, it is at least plausible that insecurity may account for some of the 
temporal variation. Future work may wish to explore this in more detail. While the downward 
trend in trust observed in the 1960s precedes the rise in insecurity, the post-sixties’ trend 
broadly fits. Indeed, insecurity appears, at least on its face, to fit better than the usual 
aggregate economic measures such as GDP, unemployment, and consumer sentiment.  
The paper, however, is limited in some respects, as are all papers. One potential 
limitation is that the categorization of the indexes is somewhat arbitrary, despite the high 
alphas indicating internal consistency. It would be possible to construct a different set of 
indexes picking up on different aspects of insecurity, which may generate somewhat different 
results. In the event, the analysis followed so far as it could the structure and measurement 
properties set out in Hacker et al.’s 2013 article and Hacker’s earlier single-authored and joint 
work, in order to generate continuity in the growing but still small economic insecurity 
research portfolio. Still, other researchers may disagree with this categorization of economic 
insecurity, and offer alternative ways of operationalizing its various elements. This should be 
welcomed, for it will increase our understanding of the concept of economic insecurity and 
its political importance. Another limitation is that the paper focused on perceived insecurity 
and did not explore the effect of experienced or realized insecurity. Above and beyond the 
limitations of space, one reason for not doing so was that it was not possible to construct 
internally consistent and uni-dimensional indexes with the available data. Future work may 
seek to address this omission.  
A further potential limitation is that the paper relies on data sampled during a period 
of great economic turmoil. The asymmetry hypothesis suggests that insecurity’s effect will 
atrophy as the economy improves. However, while it is true that the Great Recession 
































































encapsulates a period of great economic uncertainty and while insecurity increased during the 
recession, insecurity was high before the recession’s onset and was very probably increasing 
from the 1970s onwards (Hacker et al., 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Jacobs, 2007; Kalleberg, 
2013; Rockefeller, 2007). That economic insecurity has been deeply embedded in American 
society for some time and likely will be for some time to come suggests strongly that the 
results generated by the empirical analysis are not sui generis but are instead the new normal 
in the socio-economic and political life of the United States. Nonetheless, additional work is 
required to examine insecurity’s effects in a more buoyant economy and over an extended 
period of time.  
It would also be instructive to explore its effects during periods of unified Republican 
control of the presidency and Congress and during divided government. The analysis 
indicated that health insecurity’s effect on trust was moderated by the partisan rancor 
surrounding the passage of the Affordable Care Act; different political and social contexts 
may also moderate insecurity’s influence in interesting ways. In addition, future work may 
seek to estimate economic insecurity’s effect on other, more diffuse aspects of political 
support (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999). We know that job insecurity in Europe is 
correlated with lower levels of trust in the judiciary and satisfaction with the operation of 
democracy (Wroe, 2014), but we do not know whether these findings hold in the United 
States and with other types of insecurity. Future work could also extend the analysis to cover 
other types of economic concerns, with inequality a primary candidate.  
A final but related limitation is that the results here may not be applicable outside the 
United States. Many observers have commented on America’s exceptional nature 
(Tocqueville, 1835; Hartz, 1955; Lipset, 1997; Rose, 1989). One pertinent aspect of this is 
the relatively small size of its government and, relatedly, the presence of only the most basic 
government-funded welfare safety net compared to other mature western democracies with 
































































advanced industrial and post-industrial economies. In this thinking, American citizens are 
more insecure and, by extension, more distrusting because government does not protect them 
from the vagaries of life. Comparative empirical work has confirmed that Americans are 
more, and becoming more, insecure than citizens in other OECD democracies (Osberg, 2009; 
Osberg & Sharpe, 2009). Moreover, the US’s unique political structure and limited welfare 
and social provisions suggest that at least some of this paper’s results will not travel. Health 
is an obvious example. Despite recent reforms, many millions of Americans lack any health 
insurance and millions more are poorly and/or expensively insured. It is difficult to imagine 
that health insecurity’s effect would be as large in, say, the United Kingdom or France, where 
citizens enjoy more comprehensive protection. Conversely, globalization and the Great 
Recession have increased job insecurity across many western democracies, not just in the 
United States. A priori, then, we would expect smaller cross-national differences on jobs than 
on health. On the other hand, that the insecurity-trust relationship is robust even in the 
exceptional, hard case of the United States, where citizens revere rugged individualism, 
suggests that it may be robust elsewhere too. But more comparative research is needed to 
explore these and other relationships; we know surprisingly little hitherto.  
In sum, and despite these limitations, the paper offers some unambiguous and 
noteworthy conclusions regarding the importance of perceived economic insecurity on 
citizens’ political trust. This finding improves our understanding of how trust is generated 
and lost, but it also supports those scholars who are calling for a reassessment of the personal 
in the political. For many years, political scientists have downplayed the influence of 
personal economic evaluations and circumstances on political phenomena. Hacker and his 
colleagues (2013, p. 45) are right that it is time to bring them back in: “Practitioners of 
American politics know that the search for security is a powerful motive, whether harnessed 
































































for good or ill. Scholars of American politics have been much slower to recognize this reality. 
This neglect, one regrettable, is now untenable.”  
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Notes 
                                                            
1
 There is, however, a rich vein of research in psychology and occupational health exploring 
the consequences of job insecurity on workers and firms. Job insecurity generates stress and 
other mental and physical health problems, as well as driving down job satisfaction and 
performance (De Witte, 2005; Sverke et al., 2002; Sverke et al., 2006). It is also the most 
important factor in generating employee distrust of employers (Ashford et al., 1989, table 3; 
Sverke et al., 2002, tables 2 and 3). Chung & Mau (2014) provide a comprehensive review of 
































































                                                                                                                                                                                             
insecurity’s causes and consequences, and identify many challenges and opportunities for 
researchers. 
2
 The standard trust question asks “How much of the time do you think you can trust the 
government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only 
some of the time?” In addition, “never” is recorded if volunteered by the respondent. 
3
 While using the full range of response options will usually generate more precise estimates, 
this is not necessarily the case when the extreme values are very rarely chosen. In such cases 
the signal-to-noise ratio from the extra categories is likely to be very low. This is the case 
here. Estimating the models with a 5-point trust variable and an ordered logit generates 
coefficients very similar in size to the logit/dichotomous model, but the standard errors are 
somewhat larger. Moreover, the estimated cut points/thresholds are very poorly determined. 
4
 Hacker et al. (2013) present many useful basic statistics outlining the proportion of the 
American population experiencing and perceiving economic insecurity in each domain, and 
readers are directed there for details. 
5
 The composite index is based on 15 questions rather than 16 because one question (on 
getting by without your spouse’s/partner’s income) was used in both the family and wealth 
indexes. Responses to this question are included only once in the composite index to avoid 
double weighting it. 
6
 There is clearly considerable variation in Ns across questions and indexes, which raises the 
problem of systematic non-response. The key reason for the difference in Ns is that certain 
questions were only asked if respondents met specific criteria. For example, respondents were 
only asked question J1 (see table 1) if they were currently employed. All non-employed 
respondents are thus excluded from Job index and therefore the Composite index. 
Respondents were only asked F4 if they were married or part of an unmarried couple living 
together. The un-partnered are therefore excluded from the Family index and the Composite 
































































                                                                                                                                                                                             
index too. And so on. In only very few cases—and never more than 25—did respondents 
refuse to answer the question. It is the ‘legitimate skips’ that account for the differences in the 
size of the index Ns, the low N for the Composite model, and the different Ns in the 
regression models, not systematic non-response.  
Nonetheless, as an additional check, the Job, Health, Family, and Wealth models were 
re-estimated with the 364 respondents who answered all the insecurity questions (and who 
are thus included in the Composite model). The results look very similar to the original 
regressions. Overall, the results suggest there is no reason to suspect that non-response is 
systematic.  
7
 The paper follows the precedent within the discipline to treat these ordinal variables as if 
they were continuous for purposes of tractability and ease of comparison with other papers on 
this topic. 
8
 The syntax files to replicate the empirical analysis are available on the author’s webpage. 
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Table 1. Building the Economic Insecurity Indexes 
 
Index Question: Are you very worried, fairly worried, 













       
Job J1. Losing your job? 2.13 1,615 2.18 .77 1,188 
 J2. Having your retirement benefits cut 
substantially at your main job? 
2.04 2,516    
 J3. Having healthcare coverage substantially cut 
or its costs substantially increased by your 
employer? 
2.42 1,494    
 J4. Becoming unable to work for the rest of your 
life as the result of a disability?  
1.89 2,513    
       
Health H1. Losing your healthcare coverage? 2.12 2,327 2.07 .81 2,307 
 H2. Having to go into a nursing home when 
older?  
2.06 2,522    
 H3. Getting seriously ill and not being able to 
figure out what your insurance will pay for?  
2.15 2,524    
 H4. Getting seriously ill and not being able to find 
the best doctors? 
2.02 2,531    
       
Family F1. Paying your rent/mortgage?  2.12 1,748 2.08 .77 1,195 
 F2. Needing to help out a member of your 
extended family if they get in financial trouble?  
2.13 2,521    
 F3. Having enough money to put food on the 
table?  
1.84 2,519    
 F4. Getting by without your spouse’s/partner’s 
income if they were no longer around due to 
death, divorce, or other circumstances? 
2.25 1,691    
       
Wealth W1. Getting out of debt?  2.15 2,513 2.51 .77 875 
 W2. Having enough money to retire on?  2.68 2,516    
 W3. Paying for your children’s education?  2.50 1,105    
 W4. Getting by without your spouse’s/partner’s 
income if they were no longer around due to 
death, divorce, or other circumstances? 
2.25 1,691    
       
Composite
4 
(Job Index + Health Index + Family Index + 
Wealth Index)/4 




 Answers scored 4 if very worried, 3 if fairly worried, 2 if slightly worried, and 1 if not at all worried 
2
 2,561 respondents started the survey; 2,498 completed successfully  
3
 Index mean is the average of the 4 questions’ means. Only respondents who answered all 4 questions are 
included in the index mean  
4
 The composite index excludes W4 so as not to double count responses, which are already incorporated via 
the family index 
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N 910 1,726 893 633 364 
Pseudo R2 .12 .11 .10 .10 .12 
Log Likelihood -483.18 -946.54 -550.06 -381.89 -221.22 
Prob > Chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
Notes: All models estimated with logistic regression. Coefficients are log-odds (logit) regression coefficients. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<=.1, **p<=.05, ***p<=.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Dependent variable scored 0-1. See main text for more details of coding schemes for all variables 
All equations include weights, but reported N is the unweighted number of cases 
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Party ID Ideology Income
Educatio
n
Job Insecurity Model 0.196 -0.063 0.169 0.088 0.281 0.146 0.045 -0.19
Health Insecurity Model 0.108 -0.013 0.178 0.1 0.288 0.1 -0.053 -0.177
Family Insecurity Model 0.323 -0.079 0.13 0.151 0.157 0.145 0.003 0.018
Wealth Insecurity Model 0.264 -0.063 0.029 0.157 0.154 0.136 -0.134 -0.144














































Figure 2. First Differences, given change in X from lowest to highest 
category












































































Party ID Ideology Income
Educatio
n
Job Insecurity Model 0.104 -0.037 0.141 0.068 0.221 0.092 0.023 -0.109
Health Insecurity Model 0.061 -0.011 0.149 0.073 0.225 0.063 -0.025 -0.099
Family Insecurity Model 0.184 -0.045 0.107 0.109 0.12 0.092 0.001 0.01
Wealth Insecurity Model 0.15 -0.037 0.024 0.111 0.118 0.086 -0.067 -0.08
















































Figure 3. First Differences, given change in X from -1SD to +1SD
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